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Support the Troops: Gulf War Homecomings and a New Politics  




The celebrations that took place in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 stood out as 
the largest seen in the United States since the end of World War II, as hundreds of thousands 
of troops marched in triumphant parades in almost every major American city and in 
hundreds of small towns. But the pageantry did not simply celebrate American military and 
technological prowess. Spectators at these parades also engaged in a novel form of patriotism 
that emphasized unquestioning support for the troops. Representing a crucial moment in the 
American public's deepening veneration for U.S. soldiers and veterans, the Gulf War 
celebrations marked a turning point when the Vietnam-era image of the soldier as a broken or 
rebellious draftee was finally and purposefully eclipsed by the notion of the volunteer service 
member as hero. 
 
In Jarhead, a memoir of his experiences as U.S. Marine sniper in the Persian Gulf War, 
Anthony Swofford depicted his homecoming from war as something of a disappointment. 
Describing the bus trip from San Bernardino to the Marine Corps base at Twentynine Palms, 
he “recalled pictures from the World War II victory parades in New York City” and remarked 
that “our twenty buses rambling through the high desert were a let-down in comparison,” 
despite the thousands of cheering citizens lining the road to greet the returning troops. 
Swofford found himself “bored with the routine, and frustrated with the identity, the identity 
of the hero, being forced on me.”1 In contrast to Swofford’s discomfort, a Vietnam veteran 
who had been pulled onto the bus by a fellow Marine found the celebrations deeply moving. 
Swofford describes this man who “had no shoes on his dirty feet and wore tattered jeans and 
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a faded camouflage blouse of indeterminate origin.” Taking in the scene before him, “tears 
fell from the man’s eyes and rolled down his deeply wrinkled and hurt face” and he “yelled to 
the bus, ‘Thank you, thank you, jarheads, for making them see we are not bad animals.’”2  
Swofford may have felt underwhelmed by the scale of the Gulf War homecoming 
celebrations, but his convoy of twenty yellow buses was actually part of something much 
larger. Indeed, no American had seen military festivities on this scale since the end of World 
War II, as both large metropolitan centers and small towns eagerly organized victory parades. 
Such was the initial euphoria upon victory that White House staffers considered asking 
Congress to proclaim February 27 “VK Day” (Victory in Kuwait), something on a par with 
“Victory in Europe” or “Victory in Japan.”3 Indeed, even as Swofford made unfavorable 
comparisons with World War II, the city of Twentynine Palms was planning a parade of five 
thousand Marines and sailors to offer thanks to the “returning heroes” on behalf of local 
communities. In a letter inviting President George H. W. Bush to attend, the organizing 
committee noted that “most communities of our great American nation have not experienced 
a true military parade since the allied victories of World War II.” They drew a direct line 
between the soldiers of Desert Storm and veterans of earlier wars and promised that the 
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Marines would “march, as their victorious predecessors once did in our earlier history in full 
battle gear along with various military vehicles and weapons.”4  
That commentators would reach so quickly for comparisons with earlier and much 
larger conflicts is striking, as is the fact that celebrations continued in some areas through 
August 1991, thus lasting much longer than the war itself. This outpouring of triumphalism, 
which seems out of proportion in retrospect, resulted from a convergence of pride in the 
accomplishments of a reformed military, guilt over the mistreatment of Vietnam veterans, 
and relief over an overwhelming victory in the Persian Gulf. Put together, this combination of 
pride, guilt, and relief produced a mass spectacle of militarism on the streets of American 
cities and towns. Crucially, those who participated in these celebrations–from politicians to 
protestors–made the quality and inherent goodness of the American soldier a central part of 
their focus, regardless of any broader disagreements about U.S. foreign policy. 
For a crisis that transfixed American society for several months and that had immense 
regional consequences, the Gulf War has received relatively limited scholarly attention. 
Scholars of foreign relations have focused on how that conflict acted both as a means of 
banishing the “Vietnam syndrome” and as a precursor to subsequent American wars in the 
greater Middle East, while military historians have examined the extent to which the conflict 
heralded a “revolution in military affairs.”5 In recent years, historians have taken advantage 
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of newly declassified records at the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library to situate the war 
within the Bush administration’s broader foreign policy and its attempts to construct a “new 
world order.”6 An examination of the archives reveals that these records can also allow us to 
more clearly understand the domestic consequences of the war. Wary of another Vietnam, the 
Bush administration monitored and attempted to shape domestic opinion by framing the war 
and its aftermath as the antithesis to that earlier conflict. This though, was not solely an elite 
project. The archives also reveal that hundreds of communities across the United States 
organized their own pro-war rallies and, later, victory celebrations. Requests for Presidential 
attendance at or acknowledgement of these rallies provide the historian with flyers, 
schedules, and press releases. Taken together, the papers of White House staffers and the 
mass of correspondence about rallies, small and large, provides a means with which to 
examine both elite and vernacular expressions of pro-war patriotism. At all levels, a new kind 
of politics was on display, one that insisted upon reflexive support for the troops. Nowhere 
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were these politics more prominently on display than during the homecoming celebrations in 
the aftermath of the war. 
In some ways, the celebrations of 1991 present something of an outlier. Unlike other 
wars that necessitated longer, messier engagements, the Gulf War offered a comforting 
narrative of complete victory, followed by the triumphant return of the troops amid public 
celebrations. Unlike World War I, the Korean or Vietnam Wars, or even World War II, 
commentators did not worry about the challenges of re-integrating veterans into civilian 
society. The parades instead showcased the broader public's complete reverence for these 
heroic volunteers who existed outside the ordinary realm of ideological and political 
disagreement. The profusion of gratitude and triumphalism, in fact, represented the 
culmination of over a decade of work by the military and its supporters to restore its 
reputation after Vietnam. But the presence of millions of Americans in the streets celebrating 
the armed forces did not just reflect the improved standing of the military in American 
society; it also solidified a new set of relations. The Gulf War celebrations replaced the 
Vietnam-era image of the soldier as a broken or rebellious draftee with the unquestioned 
notion of the volunteer service member as hero. 
From the early republic to the Cold War, pageantry played a key role in American 
political life and allowed citizens to participate in and to help define American political 
culture.7 As Americans partook in the 1991 celebrations, different actors performed particular 
roles: civilians as cheerleaders, war veterans as heroes, generals as symbols of strategic 
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acumen, and military equipment as entertainment. Beyond the central cast of characters, 
additional groups also sought something from the parades. Conservative politicians 
emphasized the volunteer ethos of the troops who fought in the Gulf and sought to use this to 
advance policy goals and their reelection prospects. Defense contractors hoped that the 
celebration of military technology might help mitigate the budgetary effects of the coming 
post-Cold War defense drawdown. Commercial enterprises saw the festivities as an 
advertising opportunity, while anti-war protestors used the occasion to emphasize their 
credentials as patriots who supported the troops even as they decried the war itself. What all 
of these groups had in common was that they venerated the troops, no matter their other 
objectives.  
Thus, even if Desert Storm veteran Swofford’s cynicism about the national mood 
represented a misreading of the scale of the celebrations, his recollection of his homecoming 
accurately conveyed the ways in which the American public moved to rehabilitate the image 
of the American soldier. Both his discomfort with the identity of hero and the grateful tears of 
the Vietnam veteran who joined him on the bus revealed that, as much of the media’s 
attention during the war had focused on technological wonders such as the F-117 Nighthawk 
stealth bomber and the Patriot missile system, now the American soldier was very much the 
centerpiece of the war’s celebration and remembrance.8 In President Bush’s address to a joint 
 
8 Much of the literature on the media and the Gulf War, especially that on television, focuses on technology, 
spectacle, and the notion of a "clean" war. Less has been written about depictions of soldiers. Indeed, much of 
Swofford’s memoir is about the frustration of soldiers, who found themselves displaced by technology. On the 
media, spectacle, and war, see Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (Indianapolis, IN, 1995); 
Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, and Herbert Schiller, eds., Triumph Of The Image: The Media’s War In The 
Persian Gulf, A Global Perspective (Boulder, CO, 1992); Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War (Boulder, 
CO, 1992); Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq (London, 
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session of Congress on March 6, 1991, to mark the end of the war, he argued that the whole 
country could learn from the example of the Desert Storm soldiers. For Bush, these soldiers 
“accomplished more than even they may realize. They set out to confront an enemy abroad, 
and in the process, they transformed a nation at home.”9  
 An earlier draft of Bush’s address to Congress even framed the administration’s 
domestic policy agenda as one explicitly aimed at honoring these veterans. In this version, 
Bush would have proclaimed: “Let us honor those who have served us -- those who have 
shown us all that America means to the world -- by making certain that we here are worthy of 
them.”10 This rhetorical flourish elevated the soldier in new ways: rather than thinking of 
soldiering in terms of service, the draft text in fact implied that American citizens had a duty 
not just to honor veterans, but to make themselves worthy of those soldiers. While Bush had 
little success in capitalizing on the Gulf War to pursue his domestic agenda, the emphasis on 
soldiers as uniquely heroic endured. In all of the postwar celebrations, from the National 
Victory parade in Washington, D.C. to small-town homecomings, the soldier and the veteran 
comprised the heart of the festivities, and Americans celebrated them as noble, apolitical 
professionals, representing the United States at its best.  
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The Shadow of Vietnam 
Large parades marked the end of the Civil War, World War I and World War II, and while 
there were no national parades in the immediate aftermath of the Korean or Vietnam Wars, 
local groups did welcome individual units and soldiers home. Two factors, however, 
distinguished the events of 1991 from previous conflicts. First, the public expressed relatively 
little concern about how returning veterans might disrupt American society. In the summer of 
1991, Americans of every political persuasion saw celebration of the troops as a relatively 
straightforward and unproblematic act. Second, the soldiers of Desert Storm were not citizen 
soldiers, temporarily mobilized for war, but professionals for whom military service was a 
way of life.  The same had not been true of earlier conflicts. 
Following the Civil War, the ordinary soldier–as opposed to the officer corps–became 
central to celebrations and commemorations for the first time. Not only did thousands of 
veterans march through the streets of Washington before large crowds at the Grand Review 
of the Armies in May 1865; communities both North and South also erected statues of 
Johnny Reb and Billy Yank.11 Indeed, veterans and veterans’ organizations figured heavily in 
postwar politics, as former soldiers leveraged their service in the elections of the 1870s and 
1880s to win high office, and groups like the Grand Army of the Republic advocated for 
issues like patriotic education and veterans’ pensions.12 Alongside this celebration of the 
veteran, though, percolated fears, especially in the North, that veterans were broken figures 
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unable to resume their civilian lives, and therefore responsible for a postwar upsurge in crime 
and opioid abuse.13  
Similarly, the ends of World War I and World War II triggered worries about veterans 
struggling to readjust to civilian society. In both cases, the demobilization process was slow 
and fraught with difficulties, leading to mass protests overseas from citizen soldiers impatient 
to return to their previous lives.14 Even as politicians, the media, and the general public 
lauded the achievements of American G.I.s in these wars, many Americans became 
disillusioned with the military as an institution, as the difficulties of demobilizing millions of 
troops and returning to a less-effective peacetime force tarnished the glow of victory.15 In 
1945, a question mark hung over returning veterans: “would they … become a challenge to 
social stability? … Could families and marriages survive the strain of reunion? Could 
educators adapt to the large numbers of veterans clamoring for entrance into universities and 
develop new teaching methods to accommodate them?”16  
 
13 David T. Courtwright, “Opiate Addiction as a Consequence of the Civil War,” Civil War History 24, no. 2 
(June 1978): 101–11,; Brian Matthew Jordan, “‘Our Work Is Not Yet Finished’: Union Veterans and Their 
Unending Civil War, 1865-1872,” Journal of the Civil War Era 5, no. 4 (Dec. 2015): 484–503; James Marten, 
“A Running Fight against Their Fellow Men: Civil War Veterans in Gilded Age Literature,” Journal of the Civil 
War Era 5, no. 4 (Dec. 2015): 504–27; James Marten, Sing Not War: The Lives of Union & Confederate 
Veterans in Gilded Age America (Chapel Hill, NC, 2011). 
14 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore, MD, 2003), 132–
44; Susan L. Carruthers, The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace (Cambridge, MA, 
2016), 191–220. 
15 Brian McAllister Linn, Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield (Cambridge, MA, 2016), 9–
47. 
16 Michael D. Gambone, The Greatest Generation Comes Home: The Veteran in American Society (College 
Station, TX, 2005), 46; Mark D. Van Ells, To Hear Only Thunder Again: America’s World War II Veterans 
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By 1991, Americans had forgotten these earlier difficulties and only the mythology of 
the "Good War" remained. If anybody invoked the end of World War II in the aftermath of 
Desert Storm, it was to offer a vision of the events of 1945 as a similarly positive, trouble-
free celebration of victory. Instead, the shadow of the Vietnam War loomed over the 
preparations. In 1970, Nixon White House staffer William Safire had argued that there should 
be a national parade to mark the return of U.S. combat troops from Vietnam. He claimed that 
“we cannot permit peace to limp in unheralded, causing people to wonder retrospectively, 
‘when did the war end?’”17 However, apart from some local homecomings, such parades 
never took place. Vietnam veterans returned to an inadequate Veterans Administration 
hospital system and struggled to improve their minimal G.I. Bill benefits and to gain 
recognition for Post-traumatic stress disorder and Agent Orange-related illnesses.18 To an 
even greater degree than their predecessors from the Civil War, World War I, World War II, 
or Korea, Vietnam veterans faced enormous reintegration challenges. 
Given these struggles, many Vietnam veterans were dismayed by the public reaction 
to the release of hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran in January 1981. The fifty-two 
hostages, who had been held captive for 444 days, were greeted with parades in Washington, 
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D.C. and New York, and given lifetime passes to Major League Baseball games; all this 
presented a stark contrast to the silence that greeted many veterans returning from Vietnam.19 
Writing about the episode, a Boston Globe columnist reflected on the contrast and argued that 
“we already had heroes … the veterans of the Tet offensive, Hamburger Hill, Marine firebase 
Ross in the DMZ, but we didn’t recognize them. We turned our backs on them … and blamed 
them for the policies that were actually set in the White House.”20 
The Iran hostage crisis thus created a newfound appreciation for Vietnam veterans. 
An eight-page Time Magazine cover story on “The Forgotten Warriors” in July 1981 
reflected this shift. The article quoted Doug Kamholz, a former anti-war activist who said 
that “I have been feeling guilty about blaming the war on the warriors. I never yelled ‘baby 
killer,’ but I didn’t oppose it either. It was a moral and political mistake for the anti-war 
movement not to see the difference. I hope it’s not too late.”21 Veteran activists channeled 
this sympathy into the ongoing task of memorialization, with veteran-led projects such as the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the National Mall and hundreds of other smaller monuments 
 
19 The exception to this was Operation Homecoming, the 1973 return of nearly 600 prisoners of war from 
Vietnam. This group received loud public support on their return, but their experience, coupled with suspicions 
that some POWs had been left behind, also fed into fears of national decline. Michael J. Allen, Until the Last 
Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2009); Natasha Zaretsky, 
No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-1980 (Chapel Hill, NC, 
2007), 25–70. 
20 Jeremiah Murphy, “We Already Had Heroes,” Boston Globe, Feb. 8, 1981, cited in Paul Camacho, “The 
Future of the Veterans’ Lobby and Its Potential Impact for Social Policy,” in Jayne Susan Werner and David 
Hunt, eds., The American War in Vietnam (Ithaca, NY, 1993), 114. 
21 Lance Morrow, “The Forgotten Warriors,” Time, July 13, 1981, 18-35, here 33. 
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springing up across the country.22 By the mid-1980s, the Vietnam veteran had gone from 
pariah to a victim worthy of sympathy. While Time’s story on the veterans concluded with a 
veteran’s wife declaring, “with a wan smile: ‘I’d love to see a great big parade – one time – 
national,’”23 she would not need to wait long. On the tenth anniversary of the war’s end, 
25,000 Vietnam veterans, many of them dressed in remnants of their uniforms, received a 
ticker tape parade in New York City in May 1985, belatedly following the footsteps of the 
Iran hostages. 200,000 marched in Chicago a year later, cheered on by 500,000 spectators; 
100,000 marchers, led by retired General William C. Westmoreland, turned out in Houston in 
March 1987.24  
The Vietnam veterans’ fight for recognition took shape within a broader cultural shift 
in the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan’s embrace of Vietnam as a “noble cause” was 
symptomatic of revisionism about that war specifically, but extended to cultural portrayals of 
soldiers more generally as well. While memorialization practices – such as the building of 
 
22 The literature on the collective memory of the Vietnam War is extensive. For a representative sample, see 
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monuments on the National Mall – framed citizenship in terms of soldiering, popular media 
from combat magazines to Tom Clancy’s series of popular technothriller novels to action 
movies such as Top Gun (1986) promoted visions of a highly competent military, full of 
heroic warriors adept at modern war.25 These depictions were not entirely wishful thinking. 
The post-Vietnam military underwent significant reforms and updated its doctrine, 
equipment, and training. The Nixon administration established the All-Volunteer Force in 
1973 and, after a troubled beginning, it had stabilized by the mid 1980s.26 When the armed 
forces deployed to Saudi Arabia in 1990, media commentators highlighted the more racially 
diverse, mature, and well-trained volunteer force as a symbol of the strength and diversity of 
the United States--a move that Melani McAlister has termed “military multiculturalism.”27 
This combination of increasing military confidence, defense reforms, and a changed culture 
translated into concrete attitudinal shifts; in August 1990, Gallup polling indicated that 68 
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percent of Americans had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military, up 
from a 1979 nadir of 50 percent.28 
These changes mark the second major difference between the Gulf War and previous 
homecomings: unlike the draftees and short-term volunteers coming home from previous 
wars, the soldiers returning from the Persian Gulf belonged to a professional standing army. 
The troops marching in the streets of American cities in the summer of 1991 were not citizen 
soldiers on the cusp of demobilization; they were professionals who could expect to be 
deployed again in the near future. 
Many military leaders made the connection between the scale of the victory in the 
Gulf and the post-Vietnam reforms that included new doctrine, new equipment, and, 
crucially, the All-Volunteer Force.29 When the Senate Armed Services Committee asked 
Major General Barry McCaffrey how the military won the war so quickly, he replied that 
“this war didn’t take 100 hours to win, it took 15 years.”30 The Army’s official history of the 
conflict, Certain Victory, highlighted the changes by focusing on the figure of Steven 
Slocum, who had served in Vietnam as a Specialist Fourth Class and in the Gulf as a 
Command Sergeant Major. Whereas Specialist Slocum had returned from Vietnam in 1968 to 
no fanfare, Command Sergeant Major Slocum returned from the Gulf decades later with 
2,000 troops from his brigade to “thank you’s” from everyone from the flight attendant on his 
 
28 Gallup Inc., “Confidence in Institutions,” http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/Confidence-Institutions.aspx 
(accessed Nov. 26, 2018). 
29 James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia, Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam 
to the Gulf War and Beyond (New York, 1993); James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of 
Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War (Washington, D.C., 1997). 
30 Barry R. McCaffrey, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Operations Overview”, testimony before the 
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., May 9, 1991. 
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chartered Pan Am 747 to the thousands waiting “with fluttering flags and banners” at Pope 
Air Force Base, North Carolina.31 Thus, for the Army’s official history, the homecoming 
celebrations of the spring and summer of 1991 were the natural culmination of decades spent 
rebuilding. 
This story of redemption and rebuilding also became a staple of the memoirs of the 
generals who served in Vietnam as young officers. For these figures, Operation Desert Storm 
affirmed that the military’s post-Vietnam reforms had succeeded. Generals such as Colin 
Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. and Tommy Franks told stories of their frustrations in 
Vietnam followed by years of hard work to rebuild the military before finding vindication in 
the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula.32 As Andrew Bacevich observes, “virtually every one of 
these narratives conforms to a prescribed formula … From his experience in a lost war, the 
protagonist derives certain essential truths that he vows to apply if ever called upon in some 
future crisis to serve in a position of authority.” In these memoirs, the protagonist returns 
home from war to find his fellow citizens shunning those who serve, but commits himself to 
the military, “rising through the ranks during a lengthy apprenticeship. When his moment 
finally arrives, he orchestrates a great victory, by implication showing how Vietnam ought to 
have been fought. In vanquishing the enemy, he also helps heal old wounds at home, 
promoting both reconciliation and national renewal.”33 The most vivid example of this genre 
is Into the Storm, an account of the ground war in the Persian Gulf co-authored by Tom 
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Clancy and General Fred Franks, who commanded VII Corps throughout the conflict. After 
losing a leg in Vietnam in 1971, Franks underwent his personal ‘Valley Forge’ of recovery. 
As his own body heals, the Army itself is healed and rebuilt by veterans of Vietnam. Franks 
then takes command of a well-trained and well-equipped Armored Corps and defeats Saddam 
Hussein’s vast army in just 100 hours of combat.34 For the military, therefore, the parades of 
the summer of 1991 would celebrate the renewed health of the armed forces as they savored 
victory in Iraq.  
Despite these triumphant postwar narratives, however, the restored public confidence 
in the armed forces still harbored a certain brittleness. As Adrian Lewis argues, while the 
military may have “recovered materially, technologically and qualitatively during the Reagan 
Administration, it had not completely recovered emotionally and psychologically.”35 
Although the 1983 victory in Grenada had seemed all but assured, American units suffered a 
number of coordination, communication, and intelligence failures during the initial invasions. 
These difficulties echoed problems not only seen in Vietnam, but also the more recent 
botched attempt to rescue American hostages in Tehran, a debacle the military found 
humiliating. 
Iraq posed a much bigger threat. While many commentators expressed confidence 
about American prospects, pre-war media coverage emphasized that Iraq possessed the 
fourth-largest army in the world, one hardened by nearly a decade of war with Iran. The 
Veterans Administration made arrangements to clear hospital beds for the anticipated flow of 
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wounded soldiers.36 Analysts estimated that the war would result in between 10,000 and 
20,000 American casualties.37 While not on the scale of Vietnam-era protests, a substantial 
anti-war movement had emerged, and the Senate only narrowly voted to authorize the use of 
military force, with the resolution passing 52 votes to 47.38 Sales of gas masks boomed in 
January 1991 and some wrote to local newspapers to suggest that the crisis called for the 
planting of World War II-type "victory gardens."39 
Amidst these fraught arguments over the conflict in the Persian Gulf, all sides 
emphasized support for the troops. Senate Majority Whip, Wendell Ford (D-KY), who had 
voted against the war, declared that “we have a profound responsibility to ensure that the 
tragedy of the Vietnam veterans is not repeated” and called for every American to “reach out 
personally to let our service men and women and veterans know that their essential 
contribution to democracy is appreciated.”40 Indeed, Americans sent thousands of care 
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packages to soldiers stationed in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, and many displayed yellow 
ribbons in front yards and on jacket lapels.41 Celebrities embraced those serving in the Gulf, 
most notably Whitney Houston, whose bravura Super Bowl rendition of "The Star Spangled 
Banner" aired ten days into the conflict.42 The lyrics of the “Voices That Care” single–
recorded in February 1991 by a super group including Celine Dion, Will Smith, Michael 
Bolton, Meryl Streep, Jean-Claude Van Damme, and Kevin Costner–revealed how 
entertainers might embrace the troops without necessarily endorsing the war. Celine Dion 
intones “I'm not here to justify the cause / Or to count up all the loss / That's all been done 
before”, before the celebrity chorus joins in with: “I just can't let you feel alone / When 
there's so much love at home /We're sending out to you.”43 
Such messages sent fundamentally emotional, apolitical messages of support to the 
troops and their families. Indeed, even those who opposed the war made a point of publicly 
displaying their support for the troops. Todd Gitlin, for example, a prominent antiwar figure 
during the Vietnam War and an opponent of U.S. military intervention in the Gulf, donated 
 
41 For the history of the yellow ribbon and its use during the Gulf War, see Jack Santino, “Yellow Ribbons and 
Seasonal Flags: The Folk Assemblage of War,” The Journal of American Folklore 105, no. 415 (Winter 1992): 
19–33; George Mariscal, “In the Wake of the Gulf War: Untying the Yellow Ribbon,” Cultural Critique, no. 19 
(Autumn 1991): 97–117; Gerald E. Parsons, “How the Yellow Ribbon Became a National Folk Symbol,” 
Library of Congress American Folklife Center: Folklife Center News 13, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 9–11. 
42 Danyel Smith, “When Whitney Hit the High Note,” ESPN.com, Feb. 1, 2016, 
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/14673003/the-story-whitney-houston-epic-national-anthem-
performance-1991-super-bowl (accessed Nov. 25, 2018); Chuck Philips, “Stars Voice Their Support of Gulf 
Forces,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 6, 1991, F1. 
43 David Foster, “Voices That Care Lyrics,” MetroLyrics, http://www.metrolyrics.com/voices-that-care-lyrics-
voices-that-care.html (accessed Mar. 14, 2018). 
 19 
blood with NBC News cameras rolling.44 That Gitlin made such a gesture demonstrates how 
the notion of American soldiers as apolitical and worthy professionals had become an article 
of faith in American politics.45 Given the combination of widespread veneration of soldiers, 
guilt over the Vietnam experience, and fears over the level of casualties that the United States 
would sustain in a war with Iraq, the nation was primed for the explosion of joy and 
celebration that occurred with the rapid and successful conclusion of the war on February 28, 
1991. 
 
‘This Could Lay Extremely Solid Foundations for 1992’: The Bush White House and 
Homecoming Planning 
On the very day that President Bush declared a ceasefire in the Gulf, popular author Tom 
Clancy published an opinion piece in The Los Angeles Times that called for victory parades 
for the veterans of Operation Desert Storm. Clancy acknowledged “how effective our 
weapons were” but also declared that “there is no truer measure of any society than its armed 
forces. In uniform you will find the best and worst, the tools, the people, the ideas, all 
distilled in one place.” He closed with this appeal: 
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How about a few parades? How about the collective thank you that was cruelly 
denied to the last class of American warriors? We give parades to baseball and 
football teams who win at games. These kids now finishing their job are America's 
Team. They wear our colors. Can we do any less for them? The military has learned 
its lessons from Vietnam. What about the rest of us?46 
Clancy’s appeal fell on fertile ground: in a USA Today poll taken in early March, 86 percent 
of respondents said that they would go to a parade for hometown soldiers.47 Moreover, even 
as Clancy published his piece, White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu kept on his desk a 
draft schedule of homecoming events. He had solicited ideas for managing the celebrations 
from a Washington public relations consultant on February 22, two days before the ground 
campaign in Kuwait started.48   
Indeed, the Bush administration quickly spotted the potential for partisan political 
gain afforded by a celebration of the troops who had won the war so swiftly. Supporters 
urged the White House to make maximum use of the impending victory celebrations. As one 
political operative noted, “if done right, this could lay extremely solid foundations for 
1992.”49 Writing to Bush, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich offered ideas for the 
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president’s upcoming address to a Joint Session of Congress, using the volunteer ethos of the 
military to advance conservative policies. Gingrich urged Bush to tell Congress that “one 
thing we must not forget is that the brave men and women who participated in Operation 
Desert storm did so as volunteers – they chose to risk their lives for principle, for honor, for 
country and for a better, safer world. They volunteered to do the hard work of freedom.” He 
wanted Bush to call on Americans to “join with that volunteer army of freedom” to make the 
twenty-first century the next "American Century."50 While White House staffers did not use 
Gingrich’s suggested language in the actual address to Congress, Bush agreed with 
Gingrich’s claim that “our military today is fundamentally better than it was ten years ago.” 
He celebrated the “first-class talent” that “went halfway around the world to do what is moral 
and just and right,” and claimed that the victory belonged to “the privates and the pilots, to 
the sergeants and the supply officers, to the men and women in the machines and the men and 
women who made them work.”51 For both Bush and Gingrich, the volunteer military stood at 
the heart of what had gone right in Desert Storm. 
Others emphasized volunteerism as a quintessentially American trait. A concept paper 
sent to the White House Office of National Service made the connection between the skills 
displayed by the military in the Gulf and the needs of modern American capitalism. 
According to the paper’s author, “American enterprises increasingly require employees with 
the experience and qualities shown by the troops. To compete in the global marketplace, most 
US manufacturers and service industries find they must delegate responsibility for precision 
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operations to employees well down the line.” Desert Storm veterans fit the bill perfectly 
because, “as volunteer recruits they performed on time, in time and in teams…They exercised 
savvy, courage and leadership in performing their missions.”52  
This analysis drew heavily on a Washington Post column by Steven Rosenfeld that 
celebrated the victory over Iraq as springing from the democratic ideology of the U.S. 
military. Rosenfeld cited Marine Corps Colonel W.C. Gregson, who claimed that U.S. 
military doctrine “counts heavily on and encourages the initiative, skills and courage of the 
individual and the small-unit leaders.” According to Gregson, this worked only because “our 
armed forces personnel are not ‘simple soldiers’ who slavishly serve the hierarchy, as in 
totalitarian forces. In the democratic tradition, they are the purpose around which all our 
efforts revolve.” Rosenfeld concluded by arguing that “to walk in American footsteps, other 
governments must change their basic political ways – loosen up central control, devolve 
authority to lower levels, reward individual initiative….Let us ship our field manuals – and 
the Bill of Rights. This is the wonderfully subversive lesson of the war.”53 For Rosenfeld and 
other observers, the volunteer soldiers of Desert Storm not only displayed tactical and 
operational mastery, but also the best American capitalist values of personal responsibility 
and individual enterprise. 
Such was the admiration for the victors of Desert Storm that several public relations 
firms believed the administration should use them to advance its domestic policy goals of 
shrinking the size of the federal government and promoting private volunteerism. 
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Hill+Knowlton Strategies, a firm with close ties to both the administration and the Kuwaiti 
government, suggested that Bush appoint a hero of Desert Storm, such as General 
Schwarzkopf or Powell, to run “Operation Domestic Prosperity,” a 100-day initiative to make 
the United States a “home fit for heroes” by pressuring Congress to pass the Bush 
administration’s domestic agenda.54 Recalling the “freedom trains” of the early Cold War, 
they also suggested a “victory train” stocked with veterans to tour the nation and celebrate 
“the men, women and technology of Desert Storm.”55 This would be accompanied by a 
“freedom flotilla” of U.S. Navy and merchant marine vessels sailing around the United 
States, and a giant yellow ribbon stretching completely across it.56 Burson-Marsteller, a rival 
to Hill+Knowlton, proposed that the Department of Defense should carefully hand-pick and 
give media training to returning service members and then send them out to “maintain and 
expand in a meaningful way the national sense of pride, accomplishment and good feeling 
generated by Operation Desert Storm.”57 Most ambitious of all was a suggestion from 
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Kenneth Smith, CEO of a private consulting firm with ties to the Republican Party.58 He 
suggested that the administration train the more than 500,000 Gulf War veterans as “Desert 
Storm Community Service Volunteers” for an unspecified purpose. According to Smith: 
The people who participated in Desert Storm are truly an enormous national 
asset…America's young people desperately need heroes – real heroes. Real people in 
real walks of life who do the real things that make America what it is. People who 
serve their country. People who earn their money, people who have a commitment to 
excellence and competence, people who believe in the value of service.59 
 Unlike previous homecomings, in which the public and government officials worried 
about how to reintegrate veterans back into society and what sort of supports they would 
need, the Gulf War veterans would instead be the ones to provide support and inspiration to 
broader American society.  
Yet White House staffers expressed reluctance to fully embrace such ambitious 
programs. In correspondence with staff in the Office of National Service, Mary Hinds, for 
example, of the president’s Points of Light Foundation, questioned proposals that attempted 
to “incorporate military resources and organization to resolve domestic social problems” in 
lieu of substantive programs that “include and respect all segments of our society.” Hinds 
argued that “the military’s function is to be ready to defend the nation so that Americans have 
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the opportunity to pursue solutions to social problems. The military and ‘wars’ on specific 
issues with American society are not the answer.”60 
 The Department of Defense indicated similar reluctance to engage in large-scale 
social programs, but it otherwise proved eager to make use of the celebrations to promote the 
military. The Pentagon Public Affairs office contacted the White House about the 
forthcoming homecomings and shared some of its key messages. Themes that the Pentagon 
planned to emphasize included the idea that “we proved ourselves the best fighting force that 
has ever been fielded by our nation”; “America’s half million heroes are coming home”; the 
“post-Vietnam syndrome is definitely over”; and, most tellingly, that “technology works - 
investment in a strong defense remains important - there are future threats that are impossible 
to predict.”61 For the Department of Defense, the parades offered the chance to showcase 
American technology and promote investment in the military. 
The Pentagon Public Affairs office also quickly grasped the scale of the upcoming 
celebrations and noted that the logistics of troop deployments meant that “enthusiasm for 
greeting returning troops from Operation Desert Storm may outrace our government's ability 
to bring them home.” Because it was “impossible to predict precisely how rapidly the 
drawdown will occur or in what order,” the office argued that “the homecoming should not 
be planned and managed by centralized government agencies, including DoD and the White 
House. Our role is to be responsive to what is clearly an outpouring of local, state and 
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national-level support, and to provide assistance and guidance.”62 This contrasted starkly 
with what one Republican operative promoted— the idea of running something called 
"Operation Grateful Nation" on July 4. He wrote:  
The White House must be intimately involved in the planning and the coordination of 
events to be sponsored by the private and public sectors throughout the Nation to 
assure that: (i) the President is given every opportunity to participate in selected local 
events; (ii) the local planners have the benefit of White House advice and resource 
management; and (iii) the celebrations coincide with National events, including 
Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, and Veterans Day.63 
Ultimately, the White House took the Pentagon’s advice, keeping tabs on various planned 
celebrations, but taking a step back to allow others to run them “while paying particular 
attention to events that might offer political benefit to the administration.” In his March 6 
address to Congress, Bush called for “every community in this country to make this coming 
Fourth of July a day of special celebration for our returning troops. They may have missed 
Thanksgiving and Christmas, but I can tell you this: For them and for their families, we can 
make this a holiday they'll never forget.”64 Americans in both big cities and small towns 
quickly responded to Bush’s request, and parade committees sprang up across the country. 
Even though not centrally planned, these parades echoed the themes the White House had 
hoped to emphasize even before the end of the war: soldiers and veterans (including Vietnam 
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veterans) were heroes, American technology was triumphant, and the strength of a 
professional, all-volunteer military was clear. 
 
"Making Certain That We Here are Worthy of Them": The Homecoming Parades and 
Mass Spectacle 
Planning for the parades emphasized both patriotism and spectacle. At the invitation of White 
House Chief of Staff John Sununu, political consultant Roy Pfautch sent a list of suggested 
events to the White House on February 22. In addition to a New York City ticker-tape parade 
and a national celebration in Washington, D.C., Pfautch wanted to see a “parade of stars” in 
Hollywood, with a star assigned to each battalion, and a “land and water” salute in Chicago 
that would utilize the Lakefront's Grant Park to stage an aerial display and an amphibious 
landing, demonstrating “the full range of cooperative endeavor between water and air.”65 
Since the White House elected not to coordinate the parades, Pfautch’s specific ideas weren’t 
enacted, but his suggestions foreshadowed the actual celebrations in important ways. 
Celebrities and technology would figure prominently alongside the troops, and organizers did 
as much as possible to put on spectacular displays of military might.  
 The initial celebrations, such as an event in Texas Stadium, home of the Dallas 
Cowboys, that attracted 30,000 revelers, were often pro-troop rallies turned into improvised 
victory parties, and thus emphasized flag-waving and patriotism rather than military 
hardware. For later homecomings, martial pageantry formed a prominent part of the 
festivities, even in locations as small as Hueytown, Alabama (population: 15,000). The 
mayor of Hueytown sent the White House an invitation to the May 18 celebration, describing 
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a military display including “helicopters, tanks, artillery” and a day of festivities that would 
open with an “Army Special Forces flyover, followed by two squads of troops rappelling 
from hovering helicopters onto field in full battle dress to engage in mock battle, complete 
with blank ammo.”66 While not everyone opted for a full-scale mock combat demonstration,  
almost every city across the United States put on some sort of homecoming celebration. The 
major cities and communities adjacent to large military bases attracted the most direct 
military involvement, and virtually all of them hosted some sort of large-scale parade 
featuring several thousand troops. 
 Writing in 1987, the sociologist Michael Mann pointedly described the modern 
military, which relies on advanced technology and a smaller, professional armed force, as 
lending itself to “spectator sport militarism,” in which the general population mobilized for 
war “not as players but as spectators.”67 The events organized by large American cities after 
the Gulf War affirmed this profound shift. In New York City, Mayor David Dinkins planned 
a “Mother of All Parades”–a traditional ticker-tape parade up Broadway on June 10. Such 
events–where Wall Street workers threw ticker-tape (or, in later years, computer paper 
sheets) out of office windows onto returning heroes–had been in recent years reserved for 
sports teams, such as the New York Mets when they won the World Series in 1969 and 1986. 
This one would attract between 1 million and 4.7 million spectators.68 Five thousand soldiers, 
led by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Generals Colin Powell and Norman 
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Schwarzkopf, kicked off the start of a 24,000-strong procession featuring various veterans’ 
organizations, diverse community groups, and bands.69 Representatives of over fifty allied 
nations also marched in the parade, which caused some diplomatic problems. The parade 
organizers invited the Israeli Defense Forces to send a color party, even though Israel had not 
formally joined the coalition that fought Iraq.70 The organizers also initially invited Syria to 
send a delegation, although they quickly backtracked after an outcry from the families of the 
victims of the Lockerbie bombings.71 
 While New York City may have attracted the most spectators, Washington, D.C.’s 
National Victory Celebration displayed by far the most military hardware. The parade 
organizers, the “Desert Storm Homecoming Foundation,” consisted of the three major 
veterans’ organizations: the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, and Disabled 
American Veterans. They initially scheduled the parade for July 4 but moved it to June 8, 
ostensibly because Congress would still be in session then, but actually to upstage New 
York’s parade.72 General Schwarzkopf led 8,800 troops on their march through D.C., and 
then joined President Bush on the reviewing stand. A twelve-minute long flyby by over 
eighty aircraft, led by a lone F-117 stealth fighter, an icon of the war, capped off the event, 
which also included thirty-one heavy military vehicles, among them the M1A1 Abrams main 
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battle tank and the Patriot missile system.73 Major General William Streeter, Commanding 
General of the Military District of Washington, provided commentary on both the troop 
formations and various weapons and vehicles for C-SPAN, while CBS News correspondent 
Eric Engsberg reported that there was “so much military hardware moving, at times it seemed 
as if Washington was under attack.”74 Seven blocks of the National Mall were also dedicated 
to what bemused reporters called a “military petting zoo” of weaponry and equipment. One 
exhibit tent contained every type of bomb and missile used in the war, while others allowed 
visitors to try on a gas mask or practice laying (really? correct verb?) a howitzer on the 
Washington Monument.  
Indeed, such was the scale and bulk of the hardware on display that National Park 
Service personnel worried about tanks tearing up the Mall and damaging the sprinkler system 
underneath. Some asked questions about whether or not the bridges over the Potomac, 
designed for civilian traffic, could bear the weight of the seventy-tonne Abrams tanks. The 
military put in place traffic regulations allowing only one tank to cross the bridge at a time, 
keeping to under thirty miles per hour and at least two feet away from the curb on either side. 
Electric and phone companies worried about damage to their cables and several street lights 
had to be removed so that the Patriot Missile Launcher vehicle could get through. Designing 
a parade route that did not cross any of Washington, D.C.’s metro tunnels and stations, as 
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engineers feared they might collapse under the weight of the vehicles, proved most difficult 
of all.75 
The eventual parade route stretched just over two and a half miles long, but the event 
attracted only around 200,000 spectators, far below the one million that organizers had hoped 
for. The crowd featured a heavy contingent of federal employees and defense contractors, a 
group that one reporter observed was “tightly connected to the military and the bureaucracy, 
closer than most of the country to weapons and the workaday of war.”76 Along with the 
“military petting zoo” on the Mall and the hardware-heavy parade and flyby, the Pentagon 
chose to use the week following the parade to promote its budget priorities. It promoted an 
“Air Force Stealth Week” at nearby Andrews Air Force Base where reporters could visit the 
base and see a selection of stealth aircraft, including a prototype of the F-22 Raptor, the F-
117 Nighthawk, and the B-2 Spirit. Not coincidentally, Congress had recently threatened to 
cancel the B-2’s building program.77 For the Pentagon, then, the National Victory 
Celebration was a chance not just to welcome home the “half million heroes” their Public 
Affairs Office invoked in discussions with the White House, but also to aggressively promote 
budget priorities in the post-Cold War spending drawdown.  
The Los Angeles parade on May 19 featured almost as much military hardware as its 
Washington counterpart, with a flyby by four F-117 Nighthawks and a parachute jump by six 
flag-waving paratroopers. That evening saw a huge fireworks display, including the 
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simulated shoot-down of an Iraqi Scud missile by a Patriot Missile. 78 The Raytheon 
corporation also provided a seventeen-foot, 2,000-pound replica Patriot Missile for the 
parade, “symbolizing the partnership of technology and the traditional role of the citizen 
soldier.”79 Additionally, the missile held a time capsule containing military memorabilia and 
unit flags to be opened by Gulf War veterans twenty-five years later. More than 4,000 troops 
took part, followed by 2,000 veterans of other wars, bands, color guards, and celebrities such 
as Roseanne Barr, Tony Curtis, and Gene Autry. Jimmy Stewart and Bob Hope served as 
honorary co-chairmen, and Hope declared of the war: “That's the way all wars should be, real 
fast like that and get the hell out and get home.”80 
Some commentators did regard the pageantry of the parades with disdain. One, for 
example, argued that the Hollywood event had “the kind of Disneyesque tone worthy of the 
Rose Parade, as if Mickey Mouse and an M-1 tank were identical twins.”81 Others noted that 
the time spent on celebrations outstripped the length of the war itself and meanwhile people 
in Iraq now endured an “emerging tragedy of starvation and dislocation.”82 But others pushed 
back against the criticisms.  Writing in the Washington Post, Charles Krauthammer acidly 
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countered that complaints about militarism and triumphalism missed the essentially harmless 
nature of the celebrations: 
What are the critics so lathered up about? Triumphalism? The Romans knew how to 
put on a triumph: The general wore a golden crown, the enemy marched in chains and 
wagons of booty brought up the rear. Today's endlessly televised, absurdly 
choreographed Hollywood parades given to patriotic crooning by second-string soap 
stars are not triumphs. They are Trumps (of the Donald variety), exercises in mildly 
amusing vulgarity.83 
For Krauthammer, “America's genius … is not militarism but show biz. This isn't ‘Triumph 
of the Will.’ This is ‘Gilligan's Island.’”84 If this was militarism, in other words, then it was 
militarism with a particularly American twist.  
As much as these events relied on star power and spectacle, they also required heavy 
corporate sponsorship. In New York City, Mayor Dinkins faced a public outcry when he 
worried that the city’s budget crisis meant it would struggle to meet the expense of its 
parade.85 In response, the organizers enlisted American Express as both corporate sponsor 
and fundraising coordinator. The firm acquired over $10 million in donated advertising time 
to look for contributions and set up a toll-free hotline where citizens could donate to the 
parade by credit card. After initial worries, the organizers evidently had no trouble raising the 
$4.3 million needed to stage the parade. 86 Businesses were also quick to donate goods and 
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services, with one company donating 140 miles of yellow ribbon.87 In Washington, D.C., the 
Department of Defense paid $7 million towards the cost of the parade, with private 
donations–including $1 million from the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments and large 
contributions from Coca-Cola, AT&T, Walmart, and dozens of other firms–making up 
another $5 million.88 
 The homecoming celebrations also provided advertising opportunities: in the 
Hollywood parade, a new soft drink called Combat Cooler (which came in a desert 
camouflage can) sponsored a float honoring the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, while 
Kodak's float carried the newly crowned “Miss Universe.” When the military aircraft finished 
their show, civilian airplanes hauled banners over the route with such messages as “Welcome 
Home Troops from Downey Toyota” and “Welcome Home Troops-Pick-Your-Part Auto 
Wrecking.”89 Hollywood parade organizer Johnny Grant also served as Vice-President of 
local TV station KTLA. The station claimed exclusive broadcasting rights to the event and 
announced plans to charge rivals $250,000 for the footage.90 Other TV stations, such as 
KCAL-TV, countered that since it was a public event, they intended to turn up with their 
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cameras anyway, and threatened legal action. The organizers resolved the dispute when the 
mayor of Los Angeles became uneasy about subsidizing a profit-making venture and KTLA 
dropped the charge.91 
 
Welcoming Them Home “As Human Beings, Not as Victors”: Protestors and Veterans 
The White House and Department of Defense had not necessarily anticipated on this sort of 
gaudy commercialism, even if officials were happy to welcome more discreet forms of 
corporate involvement and sponsorship. But the variety in event styles across the United 
States pointed to some ways in which ordinary Americans interacted with these celebrations. 
As Kurt Piehler has argued, “remembering war the American way” has usually meant that the 
federal government allowed local communities to determine who and what to honor.92 John 
Bodnar has similarly claimed that public memory emerges from the intersection of official 
and vernacular cultural expressions.93 Certainly, the celebrations of 1991, these early 
attempts to commemorate the Gulf War, reflected that divide to some degree. On the one 
hand, large, happy audiences eagerly attended parades, organized their own homecomings, 
and thanked every veteran they could find. On the other hand, even at this moment of intense 
triumphalism, many Americans dissented from the narratives of victory. There were a 
number of arrests in both New York City and Washington, D.C., and parades in other cities 
also attracted small numbers of protestors. 
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Remarkably, protests actually managed to derail attempts to organize a victory parade 
in Seattle. Like other cities such as San Francisco (which had declared itself a sanctuary for 
any deserters from the Gulf War), Seattle had seen major anti-war and pro-war protests prior 
to Desert Storm. In an effort to placate both sides, Seattle Mayor Norm Rice invited both pro- 
and anti-war groups to form a parade organizing committee.94 But these groups argued over 
the composition of the parade, and anti-war activists asked for the troops to march without 
any weapons. Military officials from nearby Fort Lewis refused to allow troops to participate 
in the parade without their arms, and declared that they would send only their band and 
hospital unit.95 The peace groups eventually agreed to permit rifles and helmets, but balked 
when military officials insisted on adding Chapperal anti-aircraft missile launchers, armored 
personnel carriers, and trucks. At that point, the anti-war groups pulled out of the parade 
committee and began planning a countermarch.96 Meanwhile, the parade organizers struggled 
to fundraise, falling $90,000 short of their $250,000 goal.97  Eventually, amid acrimony, the 
city cancelled the parade entirely, a remarkable development in a summer full of bombastic 
displays of militaristic patriotism. Following the collapse of the parade, the mayor’s office 
scrambled to find an alternative celebration to replace the scheduled June 22 event. It 
eventually settled on a “welcome home week” coordinated with the annual SeaFair Torchlit 
parade in August, inviting members of the military to march in that procession, and offering 
free admission to sporting events, the aquarium, and the zoo for troops and their families. 
Significantly, the 1,000 troops in this alternative parade would march unarmed. Pro-war 
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groups grudgingly assented to this plan, and anti-war activists approvingly declared that they 
had always wanted an “an event that welcomes the troops home ‘as human beings, not as 
victors.’”98  
 In Los Angeles, attempts by protestors to shape public perception of the celebrations 
enjoyed less success. There, members of anti-war group SANE/FREEZE decided that rather 
than protesting the parade from the outside, as others had done in New York, Washington, 
and other cities, they would participate in it as marchers. Activist Jerry Rubin claimed anti-
war sentiment as an American tradition, proclaiming that “we want to participate in the 
parade to put forth our peace message ... Peace people shouldn't be left on the periphery, as 
outcasts.” Fellow activist Grace Aaron said she considered the show of military hardware 
“obscene,” but added: “It's more appropriate for us to be part of the parade than to be simply 
a counterdemonstration-from the outside looking in. . . . We have every right to march. We 
are citizens. We do pay taxes.”99 Initially, the parade organizers indicated that they might be 
able to accommodate the anti-war protestors, but finally decided that they would not, as such 
participation would disrespect the veterans the parade intended to honor. Indeed, the 
organizers feared what the veterans might do to the protestors. One parade organizer argued 
that the activists simply did not understand the degree of animus many veterans felt towards 
them. He said that “we have some Vietnam veterans who have a great deal of hostility toward 
the peace movement because of the way they were treated when they got back from Vietnam 
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… One motorcycle veterans’ group said put them in front of us. Another veterans group said 
put them behind us. I think they had an ulterior motive for wanting them close by.”100 
 As the use of veterans to block the participation of protestors in the Hollywood parade 
revealed, the outpouring of support for American soldiers and veterans included a narrowing 
of the terms of political debate. It was now more difficult, almost impossible, for protest 
groups to put forward anti-war arguments without being depicted as unpatriotic. The 
inclusion of Vietnam veterans in these parades, moreover, contained a critique of the anti-war 
movement’s treatment of soldiers returning from that earlier war. The commemorative 
pamphlet produced for Washington, D.C.’s National Victory Celebration made this clear 
when it included an account from a Gulf War veteran of the welcome he received from a 
wheelchair-bound Vietnam veteran. The Desert Storm veteran hoped and prayed that “our 
welcome home will in some small way make up for the one he and his brother never got.”101 
Vietnam veterans played prominent roles in the planning and execution of many of 
the parades. During the Philadelphia celebrations, for example, two Vietnam veterans 
symbolically passed a U.S. flag and a POW-MIA flag to two Gulf veterans.102 Other parades 
also featured marching Vietnam veterans: in Chicago, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Colin Powell and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Edwin Derwinksi, both veterans, 
served as grand marshals, and a group of 350 Vietnam veterans received loud cheers as they 
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marched.103 In Hollywood, none other than General William Westmoreland, the former 
commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, led a large contingent of Vietnam veterans. 
Westmoreland told reporters that “any time I can be with the troops it's an exhilarating 
experience … there's lots of camaraderie.” He also noted that “I don't think we've ever seen a 
time in history when the country is so elated and so happy about the great success of a 
war.”104 Westmoreland received loud cheers from Vietnam veterans when he appeared on 
parade, even as some veteran groups refused to participate because of his presence.105 
 Some veterans of earlier wars found the adulation for Gulf War veterans harder to 
stomach. In Orange County, California, Vietnam veteran Dan Baldwin spoke about the 
Desert Storm veterans to reporters as he attended a homecoming parade: “These guys did a 
hell of a fine job over there … I'm proud of them, but there's a bit of jealousy.” Baldwin saw 
a stark difference between the two wars: “here they are getting a parade, well-deserved as it 
is, for eight months of work and 100 hours of war. I was in Vietnam for 13 months, wounded 
twice. There was nothing for us. But it's a different society today.”106 Writing to the 
Louisville Courier- Journal on Veterans Day and looking back at the summer of celebratory 
homecomings, World War II veteran Frank O’Rourke complained about both the adulation 
for the Gulf War veterans and the grievances of Vietnam veterans. O’Rourke pointed out that 
the vast majority of veterans did not actually see combat and that the “war for them will be 
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remembered as an experience from their youth that they can reminisce about the way college 
students do about a big football game.”107 Further, there was something off-putting about 
these parades, where “soldiers looked the way civilians thought victorious soldiers should 
look – clean shaven, pressed uniforms, shiny boots, bands playing, and flags flying,” more 
like a championship-winning football or baseball team.  
In contrast, O’Rourke recalled his own experience, when he, like most experienced 
combat veterans, opted to leave the 82nd Airborne Division early rather than delay his 
discharge to take part in the homecoming parade. When he attended the division’s 1946 
parade down Fifth Avenue in New York City as a civilian onlooker, he saw a division full of 
fresh recruits that the Army had rushed in to replace the departed veterans. O’Rourke wished 
instead for a less sanitized parade, one that featured his unit when they came out of the Battle 
of the Bulge: “just columns of guys straggling down Fifth Avenue, shuffling along on 
frostbitten feet, with hand grenades tucked in the webbing of their harnesses, M-1s slung over 
their shoulders, bearded faces, gaunt eyes, hollow eyes, fatigued, exhausted physically and 
emotionally.”108 Instead, he saw the Gulf War homecomings as a continuation of a deception 
about the nature of war.  
  Generally, though, the wave of celebrations across the country drowned out 
perspectives like O’Rourke’s. Given the ubiquity and intensity of these celebrations, it is 
clear that they represented widespread popular sentiment. Perhaps the most striking 
demonstration of the ways in which Americans embraced veterans in 1991 took place at 
Bangor International Airport, Maine. Bangor became a major transit point for troops 
returning from the Middle East. Throughout the spring and summer of 1991, approximately 
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220 flights landed there, containing some 60,000 veterans of Operation Desert Storm. Local 
civic groups organized a roster of greeters so that every flight, whether it landed in the middle 
of the night or during the working day, would be met with an enthusiastic crowd of locals 
offering coffee, small gifts, free phone calls, embraces, and handshakes.109 The mood at the 
airport was generally euphoric: greeters pinned yellow ribbons on the veterans, and soldiers 
autographed children’s commemorative Desert Storm t-shirts. On one of the initial flights, on 
March 8, Sergeant Kevin Tillman grabbed a saxophone and played a rendition of the ‘Star-
Spangled Banner’ from the steps of the plane to a cheering crowd.110 
The organizers made the point that their greeting party had “nary a politician or 
bureaucrat in its ranks.”111 One greeter claimed that “we as a nation can't afford to repeat the 
mistakes we made with the troops in Vietnam. It's time to welcome home a new generation of 
veterans.”112 Similarly, local journalist Brian Swartz argued that the Bangor homecomings 
“had flipped the page historically by welcoming home our veterans, not by castigating them 
for obeying their civilian superiors’ orders and policies” and that the greeters honored “them 
for what they were: the best of the best, American men and women who had gone into harm's 
way for the rest of us.”113 Some members of the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign 
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Wars even made a point of chasing any service members embarrassed by the welcome out 
from the ramp and into the waiting arms of the crowd “where they belonged.”114 Whether 
they wanted it or not, Gulf War veterans would receive a loud and public welcome home in 
Bangor. So extensive were the homecoming celebrations, which continued until September 
1991, that the city held a special ceremony to thank the greeters in August 1991. At that 
ceremony Lieutenant General John Yeosock, who had commanded the U.S. 3rd Army in the 
Gulf, told the crowd that, much as he had been heartened by the groundswell of public 
support marked by the volume of care packages and mail sent to the troops, the scale of the 
phenomenon had not occurred to him until he landed in Bangor. But now he had no doubt 
that the greeters “manifested the totality of what it was that this great nation of ours came to 
believe, feel, understand and do.”115 
 
Conclusion 
In 2003, the citizens of Bangor re-activated their troop greeting committee and a mix of 
veterans’ groups and ordinary citizens again began to greet every military flight. This time 
the greetings extended over years, and indeed even decades, as various post-9/11 wars saw 
over 1.4 million troops and seven thousand flights land in Bangor.116 The euphoria of the 
summer of 1991 had disappeared, but the same repertoire of homecoming gestures remained: 
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hot coffee, handshakes, shouts of “welcome home” and “thank you for your service.” The 
communications scholar Lisa Silvestri has argued that such homecomings represent a politics 
of “vicarious sacrifice,” where participants combine emotional identification with the service 
members and their families with political passivity on larger questions of war and peace.117 
From airline boarding privileges for soldiers to military displays at sporting events, these 
rituals have become pervasive in American society. They contain a politics deeply 
antithetical to critical dissent, one that inflected, for instance, the recent difficulties that NFL 
players protesting police brutality encountered after conservative commentators accused them 
of disrespecting the troops.118 These contemporary political dynamics trace back to the spring 
and summer of 1991, when millions of Americans turned out to welcome Gulf War veterans–
and by extension, veterans of other wars–home. The history of those homecomings suggests 
that the seemingly deep-rooted militarism of twenty-first century American society relied on 
the specific and contingent wartime and postwar dramas designed to elicit patriotic 
demonstrations and displays of gratitude. 
 The various Gulf War victory parades were not identical, nor did they contain the 
same meaning for everyone. While members of the Bush administration and the Department 
of Defense may have been eager to celebrate the success of the All-Volunteer Force and 
promote American technological superiority, they could not control how disputes over TV 
rights marred parade planning in Los Angeles, nor could they do much about the anti-war 
protestors in Seattle who intended to welcome the troops home as “human beings rather than 
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as victors.” The celebrations in smaller towns often placed comparatively heavier emphasis 
on veterans and individual soldiers than those in the large cities, which, because of the greater 
scale of official involvement, did more to highlight weapons systems and celebrate the 
military as an institution.  
Although unconditional support for the troops rose to new heights, the national mood 
of elation in 1991 did not last. Bush’s popularity sank to the extent that he lost his re-election 
campaign the following year. In addition, the post-Cold War drawdown reduced U.S. military 
ranks considerably, from 2.17 million troops in 1987 to 1.37 million in 2000.119  Veterans of 
the Gulf War struggled, as their Vietnam-era predecessors did, to access healthcare services, 
not least when it came to the "Gulf War Syndrome," an illness that many attributed to 
exposure to environmental hazards during the war.120 
 What did endure, however, was the notion–common to official celebrations and 
spontaneous small-town gatherings, war veterans, and local TV stations–that soldiers and 
veterans represented the best qualities of the United States. Instead of being seen as troubled 
and potentially disruptive veterans bringing home psychological baggage from the war, 
politicians and the broader public celebrated the Gulf War veterans–and implicitly all 
veterans–as possessing all of the traits that the United States would need to succeed in the 
next century. In one of the major foreign policy speeches of his primary campaign, Governor 
Bill Clinton of Arkansas placed the troops at the heart of his peroration. Recalling the 
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100,000-strong crowd that had attended Little Rock’s welcome home parade, Clinton spoke 
about how he felt moved as he watched “the men and women who had served in World War 
II, Korea and Vietnam … march down the street to our cheers and saw the Vietnam veterans 
finally being given the honor they deserved all along.” For Clinton, this moment emerged as 
one in which “the divisions we have lived with for the last two decades seemed to fade away 
amid the common outburst of triumph and gratitude.”121 In truth, the divisions in American 
society had hardly faded, but nobody could escape the language of gratitude; even anti-war 
activists now used the language of supporting the troops in their protests.   
The spring and summer of 1991 thus represented a crucial moment when the 
Americans' veneration for their military deepened and intensified. The last lines of the 
Army’s official history of Operation Desert Storm revisited Steven Slocum, met with silence 
on his return from Vietnam and fêted after the Gulf. The authors closed with this hope: “let 
the Specialist Slocums of 1991 look back in 2016 at 25 years of the same support and 
appreciation they felt as they stepped off the planes following their return from Desert 
Storm.”122 Looking at what followed the summer of 1991, it seems clear that they received 
their wish. The adulation of millions of Americans both secured the rehabilitation of the 
military’s place in American society and provided a template for how to speak and think 
about American soldiers as they continued to travel to and from their wars. 
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